Author: Kate Clark
Ceasefires by the government, the Taleban and the United States over the Muslim holiday of Eid ul-Fitr has partially ended with the Taleban ordering their fighters back to “normal operations.” However, the three-day truce resulted in an unprecedented peaceful movement of fighters and soldiers into territories controlled by the other. The media was full of pictures and videos of Afghans in uniform or wearing black turbans fraternising with each other and with civilians. The Taleban rejected President Ashraf Ghani’s call to join government forces in extending the ceasefire, and some Taleban attacks were reported today. Nevertheless, says AAN Co-Director Kate Clark, the genie may be out of the bottle. It may now be more difficult for those who have just celebrated Eid together to return to killing (with input from Thomas Ruttig, Ehsan Qaane, Rohullah Sorush, Ali Yawar Adli and Ali Mohammad Sabawoon).
The ceasefire to mark the end of Ramadan was a government idea. On 7 June 2018, President Ghani called a unilateral halt to all offensive government actions from the 27thday of Ramadan to the fifth day of Eid (12-19 June). (1) That appears to have bounced the Taleban leadership into announcing their own three-day Eid ceasefire two days later, although they did not refer to the government announcement. It would have reflected badly on the movement if it had insisted on continuing to fight and kill during the religious holiday when the enemy said it would not.
Matters did not look encouraging during the days of the government’s unilateral ceasefire before Eid, when Taleban killed dozens of members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in attacks in Jalrez district of Maidan Wardak, Jurm in Badakhshan, Muqur of Ghazni, Kohistan in Faryab (capturing the district centre and killing the district governor, among others), Qala-ye Zal of Kunduz, Zawol in Herat – a sub-district of Shindand – and Sayad in Sar-e Pul (press reporting here, here and here [in German]). Even so when the end of Ramadan came and the Taleban truce kicked in, the cadres stopped fighting. They not only obeyed the order to cease fire, but went a lot further than the Taleban leadership could have imagined.
The ceasefire begins
Combatants and officials mainly, but not exclusively from the Taleban, took the opportunity to visit places and see people they had not seen for years (see the annex for a list of reported events). They filmed and photographed themselves, including taking selfies with the enemy and posted the pictures online. Anyone with a smart phone and internet connection has been able to see peace breaking out in many parts of the country: joint Eid prayers, members of the Taleban and Afghan National Security Forces embracing each other, euphoric crowds, a Taleb handing out roses to Afghan army soldiers, Interior Minister Wais Barmak coming back from Maidan Wardak stopping his car to greet some Taleban who had entered Kabul. Such ‘fraternisation events’ were reported in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Farah, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, Wardak, Kabul, Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Faryab and Badghis. Quite a few meetings involving ‘seniors’ – government and shadow district and provincial governors, police and army chiefs and Taleban commanders – were also reported to have taken place during the three-day truce:
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The Badghis governor Abdul Ghafur Malekzai met Taleban
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The Farah governor Basir Salangi met Taleban
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The Logar governor and Taleban shadow governor offered prayers together
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The Herat provincial police chief met local commanders
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The Logar provincial police chief, Muhammad Abdali, met commanders
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The provincial chiefs of police and NDS in Uruzgan marched towards Taleban positions to invite them to join Eid celebrations
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A “big meeting” of officials with Taleban in Jalalabad took place at the governor’s office
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“High-ranking Taleban” met officials in the Zabul governor’s office
The mingling was spontaneous and uncontrolled, the result a sort of benign chaos. There was a lot of risk in this. Taleban fighters, for example, did not all leave their arms when they crossed the ‘frontlines’ into government-controlled areas, but ANSF allowed them through anyway. It seems the fighters did not abuse that trust (although fears have been voiced that the Taleban may have pre-positioned armed fighters for after the Eid – more on which below).
Reports from both media and social media were overwhelmingly positive, although there may be some reporting bias here, that fraternisation was reported, but its absence in other places was not. Uneasiness from some in the general population was also reported, although less prominently than the euphoria (see press reporting here and here. Amrullah Saleh, claiming to represent a large swathe of the population, also tweeted his bewilderment at events: “The anti Taliban constituency which provide the bulk of troops to ANDSF [Afghan National Defence and Security Forces] feel betrayed, confused & sold out.”
Women were noticeable by their absence. Where they were publicly involved, it was noted: young activist Muqadasa Ahmadzai going to a Taleban-controlled area of Nangrahar to demand they extend the ceasefire, women in Helmand demonstrating and also demanding the Taleban extend the ceasefire and the BBC’s Malaeka in Kabul going to “challenge” Taleban entering the city on their policy of excluding women from public life.
The ceasefire was broken by only two attacks, both in Jalalabad, and the first, at least, claimed by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP). On the second day of Eid, 16 June, a suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of a crowd of Taleban, ANSF and civilians in Rodat district in Nangrahar province. The bomber killed 36 people and wounded many more. On the third day of Eid, a bomb planted near the governor’s office in Jalalabad where people waited for the end of a meeting of government officials and Taleban, killed at least 18 and injured 45, according to the local health department.
The Rodat bombing on the second day of Eid was the official reason given by the Taleban leadership for ordering their fighters to “remain in their trenches [sic] and areas of control and to not venture into enemy controlled areas or cities even briefly.” A statement said they wanted to remove the opportunity for “the enemy” (unspecified) to misuse the ceasefire to harm the Taleban and other Afghans and so were ordering their fighters to stop “participating in… crowds and gatherings.” Ordering Taleban to return to their side of frontlines, however, actually looked like an attempt to stop fighters fraternising with the enemy (more on this below).
The leadership warned it would deal “rigorously” with “cases of violation.” 1TV reported the leadership was angry with Taleban who had taken selfies with ANSF. Given that Taleban were killed in the second bombing in Jalalabad and mingling continued to be reported on day 3 of Eid, some fighters did violate the leadership’s order.
Ghani calls for an extension of the truce, the Taleban go back to fighting
On 16 June, President Ghani announced a unilateral extension of the ceasefire until 20 June and called on the Taleban to do the same. In a series of tweets (2) and a televised address, he said it could be a time when wounded Taleban could seek treatment and family members visit Taleban prisoners. He also, again, offered “comprehensive negotiations” saying that Kabul was ready to discuss an issue of central importance to the Taleban – the presence of foreign forces. This suggestion first came in the final declaration of the February 2018 Kabul Process 2 meeting (AAN analysis here). Ghani also said “issues of mutual concern with neighboring countries” would also be up for discussion – possibly intended to allay the worries of the Taleban’s backers in Islamabad.
The Taleban refused his offer, saying “normal operations” would resume on 18 June. Insisting that their ceasefire had not been a “response to the ceasefire of the Kabul regime,” they said it had proved the cohesiveness of their command, while the welcome given to their fighters “by the people proves that the demands of the Islamic Emirate and the nation are identical – all want the withdrawal of foreign invaders and establishment of an Islamic government.” It called on the US to sit and negotiate with the Taleban and to withdraw its forces, a demand repeated from Taleban leader Haibatullah’s Eid message on 12 June.
The fact that the Taleban only issued a statement saying operations would resume very late on the last day of Eid suggests the decision had not been straightforward. Indeed, The Guardian reported that discussions had been difficult:
According to insiders, the leadership was stunned by the jubilant scenes in city centres. The hardline deputy leader and son of Mullah Omar, Mullah Yaqoob, was particularly dismayed. In an audio message obtained by the Guardian, he said there had been “no permission for mixing with Afghan forces”, which he said “totally disobeyed the terms of the ceasefire”.
One senior Taliban member said the leadership, recognising the pressure for peace within the group’s ranks, was considering a 10-day ceasefire over the next Eid festival, in September. However, he said there was disappointment that Ghani had not been more specific on the subject of US troop withdrawal. “Ghani should have created a timeline,” he said. “That might have created attraction to extend the ceasefire.”
On 18 June, the Taleban did, bloodily, resume, their operations, with the shooting of Subhanullah Khetab, acting governor of Ghanikhel district in Nangrahar, as he drove to his office. According to government officials, there were Taleban attacks in nine provinces, including Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman in the east and in Helmand and Kandahar in the south, with 12 soldiers killed (media report here).
The end of the ceasefire also coincided with the arrival of the Helmandi peace marchers into the Afghan capital, boosted along the way by supporters. This spontaneous, grassroots, non-aligned initiative is demanding that both sides stop fighting, enter talks, draw up a timeline for the withdrawal of foreign troops and devise a system “acceptable to all sides” (see AAN reporting here). The sight of the men walking 700 kilometres in 40 degrees of heat while abstaining from water during the Ramadan fast, but supported by villagers all along the way, was intended to demonstrate, the marchers said, ordinary Afghans’ “thirst for peace.” It has also helped galvanise popular, pro-peace sentiments in the county.
What does the ceasefire mean?
Calling a unilateral ceasefire was a gamble by Ashraf Ghani that, so far, appears to have paid off. It forced the Taleban first into calling their own ceasefire and then into embracing a stance that publically favours war over talks – after peace was shown to have popular and widespread appeal, including among some of their own fighters.
For the Taleban, who feel they are doing well in the war, taking territory and threatening the government in a number of provinces (see AAN reporting here, here, here and here), the attraction of fighting on is strong. Despite the extreme unlikelihood of anyone winning the war militarily, the leadership may believe they can improve the movement’s relative position. Nevertheless, their insistence on continuing to fight has now cast them strongly as the ‘pro-war party’ and this may be politically damaging for them.
What happened over Eid was deeply subversive, politically and militarily dangerous to any party wanting to prolong the conflict. It demonstrated that a ceasefire, held to completely by both sides, is possible. It revealed a strong peace camp among Afghans that crosses frontlines and opened up the imaginative space for Afghans to see what a future without violence could look like. Perhaps most significantly, it allowed human contact between enemies. After the mass fraternisation, it may be more difficult for Afghan combatants to think about killing each other. After praying with your fellow Afghan, it may be trickier to cling on to the view that he is just a puppet of the _kufar _or of the ISI.
This works both ways of course, but it seems particularly dangerous for the Taleban, given that they have ended the truce unilaterally. Moreover, this is a movement that relies on discipline, obedience and a belief in the rightness of the armed struggle, that members are fighting a jihad. After the three-day holiday truce, some Taleban may be left wondering why it has become religiously justified to start killing again. Those who came into the cities will have found them not to be the cesspits of decadence and Westernisation they had been told they were, but to be populated by people celebrating Eid as they do (see here).
There has already been some disobedience in the ranks, with not all Taleban following orders and going back to the ‘trenches’ on the third day of Eid. Anecdotally, not all were pleased at being ordered to fight again after the end of the holiday – see statements in the annex. The Guardian quoted one fighter, 22-year old Muhammadullah, saying:
“I and thousands of Afghan Taliban definitely want the ceasefire extended,” …“I went to the city and the mosques were full of people, I did not notice anything against the Islamic rules. After the sweet three days of peace, going back to bloodshed looks strange. How can you even compare peace with war?”
One gathering of Taleban was also reported on 18 June in Paktika’s Urgun district, an area under Haqqani network control where fighters called on their leadership to extend the ceasefire. It is difficult to think of a precedent for this sort of behaviour.
Edited by Thomas Ruttig